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Protective Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette
Margaret Martin Barry *
Introduction
A psychologist friend expounded recently on her views regarding
domestic violence. She believes that women contribute to the violence of
their batterers, in part, by demanding changes in the interpersonal dynamic
that men are not psychologically equipped to handle. The cultural trends
that have led women to make these demands are more advanced than
ingrained social mores, and the result is tension, frustration, and violence.
According to her, the courts, especially those in the criminal justice
system, should have no role in resolving these intricate family issues.
They need to be worked out over time through counseling and with the
goal of preserving these essential relationships.
My friend's view relegates domestic violence l to the realm of enigma,

* The author is an Assistant Professor at Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America, where she teaches the Families and the Law Clinic. She would like
to give special thanks to her research assistant, Vivian A. Mikhail, for her dedicated work
in preparing this piece.
1. Definitions of the term domestic violence have been both over-inclusive and underinclusive. According to Del Martin, "domestic violence" refers to the use of physical force
by one adult member of a household against another adult member, as distinct from "family
violence" which includes physical and sexual abuse of children. Del Martin, The Historical
Roots of Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 3 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed.,
1987). The Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence by the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges (adopted Jan. 1994), describes domestic violence as the
occurrence of one or more of the following acts by a family or household member, but
does not include acts of self defense:
(a) Attempting to cause or causing physical harm to another family or
household member;
(b) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical harm; or
(c) Causing a family or household member to engage involuntarily in
sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress.
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES' MODEL CODE ON
DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, § 102(1) (1994).
Due to the violence experienced by women and girls in dating relationships, a number
of jurisdictions have included dating relationships within the statutory defmition of domestic
violence, calling into question the requirement that there need be cohabitation or other
forms of intimacy associated with familial contact. See D. C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (5)(B)
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makes intervention loathsome to police and prosecutors alike, and supports
notions that place judicial intervention in the basement of the courthouse,
at best. I could dismiss my friend as biased, out of touch, or ill-informed.
In truth, however, her view represents how many people continue to view
the situation despite what the literature2 and community initiatives would
lead one to believe.
The sluggish criminal justice response to domestic violence led
women's groups in the early 1970s to seek legislative alternatives to state
prosecution and to obtain structural reform of state law enforcement efforts
through statutory requirements and conforming policy changes. 3 The
approach by women's groups has been three-pronged: to gain better police
intervention, to increase criminal prosecution, and to utilize civil orders of
protection. Civil orders tend to be most accessible and attractive to

(West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
The definitions of domestic violence are gender neutral, and should be, although it is
an exception to the rule that men (in other than gay relationships) are the objects of
domestic abuse.
90% to 95 % of those experiencing domestic violence are women.
Russell P. Dobash, The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence, 39 Soc. PROBS. 71,
74-75 (1992). At the same time, it should be noted that domestic violence is as prevalent
in the gay and lesbian community as it is in the heterosexual community. Sandra Lundy,
Abuse that Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay Domestic
Violence in Massachusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 273, 277 (1993); Denise Bricker, Note,
Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered Woman's Syndrome Expert Testimony for Gay Men
and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive Partners, 58 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1379, 1382 (1993).
2. The literature dates back through the ages, including times in which "women knew
their place." We use the following quote from the Fifth Canto of Orlando Furioso, by
Ludovico Aristo (1474-1533), in the clinic in which I teach:
Every species of beast which dwells on this earth lives in peace among its
kind - and if fight it must, yet the male will never attack the female. The
mother-bear goes safely through the forest with her mate. The lioness lays
herself down beside the lion; the she-wolf lives secure in her consort's
company, and the heifer has no fear of the young bull. What scourge,
though, what abomination has descended to wreak disturbance in human
breasts? Listen to husband and wife constantly bandying insults, tearing
each other's faces, striking each other black and blue and leaving their
wedding beds bathed in tears - and not only tears, for sometimes brute
anger has bathed them even in blood. That a man should bring himself to
strike a fair maiden in the face or break but a strand of hair I take to be not
merely a great wrong, but an act wrought against nature, an act of rebellion
against God; as for the man who gives her poison, or who sunders soul
from body with steel blade or garotte, never shall I believe that such a one
is truly a man, but rather a fiend in human shape.
LUDOVICO ARIOSTO, ORLANDO FuRIOSO 39 (Guido Waldman trans., 2d ed. 1983).
3. The bias against domestic violence cases has been reported by numerous state gender
bias task forces. Responses range from prosecutors refusing to prosecute domestic violence
complaints to criminal judges sanctioning women who drop charges. The gender bias
practiced by these "officials" is also evidenced by victim-blaming and disbelieving the
women's stories. The Effect of Woman Abuse on Children, NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN
AND FAMIL Y LAW 86 (1991) [hereinafter Effect on Children].
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survivors4 of domestic violence for reasons I will discuss below.
Enforcement of the orders in most jurisdictions, however, leaves much to
be desired.
This article first examines the reasons for committing
significant resources to fight domestic violence. It then discusses the
central role of effective enforcement of protective orders as a strategy for
responding to this debilitating problem.

I.

Why Make Domestic Violence Intervention A Priority?

This society places a high value on safety, particularly in the home.
Individual expressions of concern vary with regard to whose safety is
contemplated, but the strongest emotions5 are usually expressed with
regard to the healthy development and security of children. Domestic
violence has a negative physical and emotional impact on children. 6
Violence often begins or increases during pregnancy. 7 Nearly 50 percent
of abusive husbands batter their pregnant wives, and these wives are four
times more likely to bear infants of low birth weight. 8 Children who

4. "Survivor" has entered the lexicon as an alternative to the concept of learned
helplessness reflected in the term victim. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER,
BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS (1988); LEE A. HOFF, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS (1990). The term
survivor forces acknowledgement of the struggle that women in abusive situations undertake
to preserve important relationships within the confmes of a hostile social structure. The
strength is there, shockingly at times, to persevere in an effort to maintain dangerous
relationships and the structure surrounding them. Gondolf and Fisher conclude that
"battered women demonstrate tremendous resiliency, persistence, and strength which press
for a less pathological orientation . . . . [W]e believe their experience points to an
alternative characterization-one that considers battered women fundamentally as
survivors." GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 4, at 3.
The problem with the term survivor is that it imposes bravado on women who want
their lack of power in the face of constant assault acknowledged. Survivor may not
describe how those who have experienced domestic violence feel about where they are or
have been. It also requires a resilience of them that is not expected from other victims of
crime who are viewed with sympathy. Nonetheless, survivor is preferable to victim
because passivity is often dangerous, given the distance that must be travelled in countering
the societal tolerance of domestic violence and the limitations of the most responsive social
structures, in the face of domestic abuse. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and
Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67
N.Y.V.L. REv. 520, 529-66 (1992).
5. I use the term "emotions" since policies regarding the treatment of children hardly
reflect a societal commitment to their welfare.
6. See MARIA RoY, CHILDREN IN THE CROSSFIRE (1988); PETER G. JAFFE ET AL.,
CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN (1990).
7. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 827
(1993) (stating that pregnant women face an increased risk of physical abuse that often
results in greater instances of physical injury).
8. Hearings on Women and Violence, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, WIst Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990).
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witness parental violence are always affected; 9 they are traumatized by
shock, fear, and guilt. Children suffer somatic complaints, such as
insomnia, diarrhea, generally higher rates of illnesses as infants, and a
higher incidence of colds, sore throats, abdominal pain, asthma, headaches, as well as bedwetting for older children. 1O The effect of parental
violence on children is also evidenced by delayed speech, delayed motor
and cognitive skills, and poor school performance. II In addition to the
effects that result from witnessing violence in the home, children are often
"accidentally harmed by blows or flying objects aimed at the mother, or
are stepped on, or stumbled over, or dropped when the mother is
attacked. " 12 These children are also at high risk to become targets of
abuse. 13
Violent crime is consistently identified as a major concern in this
country. It is not unfounded to conclude that the trauma and aggressive
behavior learned in violent homes finds expression in aberrant behavior
elsewhere. 14 In fact, experiencing violent behavior in the home as a child
is the single highest predictor of violent behavior, inside and outside of
domestic relationships, as an adult. 15
In addition to concerns about children and non-domestic crimes, there
is a societal interest in protecting women who are subjected to domestic

9. Effect on Children, supra note 3, at 7.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at ii.
13. The rate of child abuse was 129% higher in families with spousal abuse. Id. at 13.
See also Domestic Violence: Its Relation to Child Abuse, LEGAL RESPONSE: CHILD
ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION (ABAlNat'l Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and
Protection), June-July 1979, at 1; Alan J. Tomkins et aI., The Plight of Children Who
Witness Woman Battering: Psychological Knowledge and Policy Implications, 18 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 137, 152-53 (1994) (discussing the increased likelihood of abuse for
children who witness domestic violence).
14. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 13931-14040 (West Supp.
1994) [hereinafter V.A.W.A.] (enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (West Supp. 1994)). See
also Nancy S. Erickson and Joan Zorza, Women and Family Law in 1994, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 1117 (1995). The V.A.W.A. includes funding for supervised visitation
centers for children who have been removed from the home or from a parent who batters.
42 V.S.C.A. § 13751(a)(2)(J) (West Supp. 1995).
15. See WILLIAM L. HART ET AL., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT 2-3 (1984) (concluding that family violence is cyclical, as
manifested by children who have grown up in violent homes and later become abusers of
their own children); Murray A. Straus, Physical Violence in American Families: Incidence
Rates, Causes, and Trends, in ABUSED AND BATTERED: SOCIAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES
TO FAMILY VIOLENCE 28-29 (Dean D. Knudsen & JoAnn L. Miller eds., 1991)
(illustrating that family violence suffered by a child greatly contributes to the probability
that as an adult the child will engage in similar violent behavior).
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violence. Despite our culture's historical ambivalence on this issue,16 it
is difficult to accept abandoning the fierce sense of protection and concern
for the safety and well-being of one's daughter, wife, mother or friend to
precepts of male privilege. A survivor's family and friends may seek
alternatives to this perceived societal indifference. Furthermore, to the
extent that women feel isolated, abandoned, and trapped, they may resort
to violence to protect themselves; society has an interest in avoiding that
level of desperation in its citizens. 17
The social costs of domestic violence have not been proportional to the
level of response. Our tendency has been to shunt domestic violence into
a fuzzy corner, where the state, like a careless parent, coddles the criminal
and scolds the wayward survivor for her lack of resolve. This system that
perpetuates misplaced blame must continue to be modified so that it can
more effectively address the negative societal impact of violence within the
family.

II.
A.

MANDAIDRY

Legal Responses to Domestic Violence
ARREST

The police are on the front line of intervention in domestic violence
incidents since they are often called in to stop or prevent an attack. The
message sent by the reporting officer plays an important role in the
woman's safety, influencing both the batterer's view of his actions and the
woman's faith in legal intervention. So long as police intervention
amounts to no more than mediation, encouraging the batterer to "walk
around the block" to cool off in an attempt to keep the family intact,
women are in danger. For this reason, forty-three states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have passed legislation
requiring warrantless arrests where there is probable cause to believe that
a domestic assault or threat of assault has occurred. I8 These laws and

16. R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate' Victims of
Marital Violence, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 426 (1978), reprinted in BEVERLEY BALOS & MARy
LOUISE FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION 185-93 (1994) (discussing the legal, religious, and cultural
support of a marital hierarchy that subordinated women and legalized violence against
them).
17. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1987).
18. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (1994); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B)
(1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a) (West
Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-803.6(1) (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38b(a)
(1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581(a-l) (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(5) (1995); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-4-20. 1(a) (1993); HAW. REv. STAT. § 709-906(2) (1994); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-6312(2) (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 601301 (a) (Smith-Hurd 1995); IOWA
CODE § 236.12(2)(a)-(d) (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307(b)(1) (1994); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 43 1. 005 (2)(a) (1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140(1) (West 1995); ME.
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policies make it clear to police officers that domestic violence is to be
viewed as criminal activity and should not be replaced by theories that
would have them preserve the family at all costs.
Mandatory arrest has not, however, been a panacea for the jurisdictions in which it applies. In fact, there have been several negative
implications. For instance, police officers have arrested the survivor, or
both the survivor and the batterer, because they failed to determine who
the primary aggressor was in the situation. 19 The reasons for this type
of inadequate police response include the police officers' fear of failing to
comply with the requirement that an arrest occur, their resistance to the
requirement, and confusion as to who the primary aggressor was in the
incident. 20 The woman who has been assaulted may be angry or
traumatized, while at the same time her partner, having vented his rage,
is calm and in control, making it difficult to identify the aggressor. 21
Illustrating this point is a case in which I represented a survivor in
seeking a protective order. When the assault occurred, the survivor was
so upset by her partner beating her, breaking furniture, and destroying her
things that by the time the police arrived, she was sitting on the floor
shredding the remainder of her clothes. Her partner calmly reported to the
police that she had gone crazy and was responsible for trashing the place
and destroying her clothes. The police, misjudging the situation entirely,
took her to the local mental institution where she was kept for one week
before being released.

REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 321 (West 1995); MD. PAM. CODE ANN. § 4-509 (1995);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A § 6(7)(a)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1995); MICH. COMPo LAWS
§ 764. 15(1)(d) (1994); MINN. STAT. § 629.341(1) (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(1)
(1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.085(2) (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 171.137(1)
(Michie 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 173-B:9 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(C)
(1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(A)(1)(a)(ii) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit.
22, § 40.3(B) (1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 133.310(3)-(6) (1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 271 1(A) (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(B)(1)-(3) (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2570 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-2.2 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7103(7)(a)(i)-(ii) (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2(3)(a) (1995); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 10.31.100(2) (1995); W.VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(3) (1994); WIS. STAT.
§ 968.075(2)(b)(1) (1994); WYO. STAT. § 7-20-102(a) (1994).
19. See S. Crane, Washington's Domestic Violence Prevention Act: Mandatory Arrest
2 Years Later, 3 WOMEN'S ADVOCATE 1 (May 1987) (discussing legislation in Washington
state requiring police to arrest only the primary aggressor).
20. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: New
State and Federal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1528, 1538-39
(1993 ) (discussing the phenomenon of dual arrests, the result of mandatory arrest schemes
that require arrest where there has been bodily harm, thereby making a woman who hurts
her abuser in self-defense also subject to arrest).
21. See ANN JONES, NEXT TIME SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATTERING AND How TO STOP IT
89 (1994) (discussing how batterers can appear perfectly reasonable, in control, and
agreeable to others, especially police officers, when such behavior is in their best interests).
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In instances where the police arrest the batterer, survivors often
experience mixed feelings about pursuing prosecution. The survivor's
response to arrest may include feelings that she has betrayed her partner,
regret over the loss of this central though damaging relationship, fear of
his or his family's response, and stress related to the economic implications
of separation. This may discourage police support and willingness to
arrest, despite legal mandates to the contrary and evidence indicating that
merely arresting the batterer can reduce the incidents of violence. 22

B.

CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

Upon arrest, domestic violence can be prosecuted under state criminal
statutes proscribing assault, mayhem, threat of violence, and destruction
of property, to name a few. Domestic violence can also be prosecuted
under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) , which makes
it a federal crime to cross state lines with the intent to injure a spouse or
another intimate party when such action results in bodily injury.23 The
failure of states to vigorously prosecute domestic violence crimes has
contributed to the proliferation of protective order statutes. When
domestic violence is prosecuted, survivors can become alienated or angered
by the process. Prosecutors can become frustrated by the survivor's lack
of resolve, and it is difficult to gain convictions for crimes that often lack
corroboration. Where convictions do occur, the results can be disastrous
for the survivor, who may lose financial support from the defendant and
suffer the condemnation of his, and sometimes her, family for causing
their loved one to be incarcerated.
Policies that inhibit prosecution can increase the danger to the
survivor. Until recently in the District of Columbia, cases were routinely
not prosecuted in instances in which the survivor did not file a complaint
on the morning following the alleged incident. Unless the survivor
successfully communicated to the prosecutor's office that she was
hospitalized, her case is dropped. This happened despite her fear, her
inability to obtain child care, her inability to miss work, and her aches and
pains resulting from the assault. This unfortunate practice placed the
burden of prosecution squarely on the survivor, who is intimately aware
of the danger of such a responsibility.
The perpetrator has a greater interest in returning to, and is more
vested in continuing with, his criminal activity towards the victim where
the relationship is familial and emotions are deep and conflicted. For this
reason, many jurisdictions have recognized the importance of prosecuting
22. See L. Sherman & R. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 1
REp. 1 (1984); Sarah Mausolff Buel, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic
Violence, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 213, 216 (1988).
23. Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(l) (West 1994).
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domestic violence cases so as to take the responsibility for the prosecution
away from the survivor.24 Police officers and other witnesses can be
relied upon as complaining witnesses in bringing criminal charges, at least
until the actual trial. 25 It should be made clear that the state, not the
survivor, is seeking the sanctions. Recognizing the implications of the
survivor's relationship with her assailant, and incorporating this into the
prosecution strategy, requires the training of special prosecution units.
Such units would have a sufficient background in the dynamics of domestic
violence so as to possess the ability to respond effectively to the survivor's
conflicted behavior and the risks she faces. These special units also would
be responsible for handling the prosecution of all crimes in which the
survivor and perpetrator have a domestic relationship. Several jurisdictions have, in fact, already established such units. 26
Criminal prosecution of domestic violence cases also requires creativity
in applying criminal sanctions. If the prosecutor takes the survivor's need
for child support into account when advocating sentencing, the prosecutor
could avoid punishing the survivor who must otherwise compensate for the
lack of financial support for the children. 27 Yet, this must be done

24. Policies that require domestic violence crimes to be prosecuted with or without the
participation of the survivor started almost a decade ago in San Diego, California. Mark
Hansen, New Strategy in Battering Cases, 81 A.B.A. J. 14 (1995). Between 30% to 40%
of the jurisdictions in the country have followed suit. While drawbacks, such as forgetting
the survivor's welfare in the zeal to prosecute, have been noted, the increase in the
conviction rate has been tied to a reduction in domestic homicide and rearrest rates. [d.
25. Requiring the survivor of domestic violence to sign the complaint makes it appear
as though the decision to prosecute is hers, not that of the prosecutor and the judge.
Furthermore, there is no federal constitutional right to confrontation at preliminary
hearings. By avoiding such appearances, the survivor is spared some of the harassment and
intimidation caused by repeated appearances and confrontation with the abuser. HART ET
AL., supra note 15, at 29-31.
26. The establishment of special domestic violence prosecution units was recommended
by the Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence. [d. at 27-29. See also THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES' MODEL CODE ON
DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, §§ 210-11 (1994) (recommending written procedures
for prosecutors, including notification to the survivor when the prosecutor has decided not
to prosecute, dismiss, or enter a plea agreement). Los Angeles has implemented programs
and policies to encourage the prosecution of restraining order violations. The Office of the
Los Angeles City Attorney has established a Domestic Violence Prosecution Unit, whose
stated mission is to "prosecute provable violations of domestic violence restraining orders
in order to prevent further acts of violence," pursuant to California's Domestic Violence
Prevention Act. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6220 (Deering 1995). The unit applied a "no-drop"
policy which stated that the survivor may not drop criminal charges once filed by the City
Attorney's Office. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, which
prosecutes all of that jurisdiction's non-juvenile criminal matters, is also preparing to
establish a domestic violence unit. This operational plan is still being developed, and
preliminary changes have been made to incorporate a number of the Attorney General's
Task Force's recommendations.
27. See Report o/the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L. REv. 485
(1993); Harvey Wallace & Shanda Wedlock, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Gender
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without undermining the impact of the sanctions imposed. It is not useful
or fair to designate batterers as a special category of criminals who deserve
counseling instead of incarceration due to their familial ties with their
victims. This response sets domestic violence apart from other crimes,
treating the perpetrator as one in need of guidance and treatment, thereby
absolving him from societal reproach.28 While alternative sentencing
should be encouraged as a general proposition,29 it sends the wrong
message to the batterer and society if this discreet group of criminals is
regarded as less culpable, warranting treatment instead of punishment,
because of their intimate relationship with their victims. At the same
time, the societal interest in punishing the batterer should not mean that the
survivor and the rest of her family suffer destitution. Issues of support
relate directly to protection; economic responsibilities must not be
completely abandoned in pursuit of traditional incarceration. 30 Efforts at
creative sentencing, including the integration of family and criminal
systems to allow for support and protection of the survivor and her
children, are a long way down the road in jurisdictions still restrained by
dated concepts of criminal justice.
Issues: Parental Responsibilities, Pregnancy, and Domestic Violence, 2 SAN DIEGO
JUSTICEJ. 395 (1994); HART ET AL., supra note 15, at 34-35 (recommending dispositional
alternatives in family violence cases in order to address the financial responsibilities of the
batterer to the survivor and the family, as well as the therapy needs of the batterer). See
also Reed, infra note 28.
28. While arrest in and of itself is significant in expressing to the batterer society's
denunciation of his behavior, it is imperative that sentencing reflect the seriousness of the
crime so as not to depreciate the importance by imparting lenient sentences. See Stephen
B. Reed, The Demise of Ozzie and Harriet: Effective Punishment of Domestic Abusers, 17
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 337, 364-68 (1991).
29. The debate surrounding creative sentencing raises a multitude of issues regarding the
appropriate sanctions for various crimes. While advocates argue that alternative sentencing
alleviates prison crowding and reduces costs, opponents assert that liberalizing sentencing
terms undermines appropriate punishment for criminal offenders. In the domestic violence
context, the diversion of cases to counseling programs separate from the criminal justice
system has been suggested. Apart from the danger of domestic violence being viewed as
a less serious crime because of diversion, concerns about such an option revolve around
who is to make such a recommendation or determination, and what factors should be
considered in doing so. Factors that may be considered are the batterer's prior criminal
history and the seriousness of the abuse. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1528, 1548 (1993); See also Report
of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note 27; Wallace & Wedlock,
supra note 27.
30. Judges should use a variety of sentencing alternatives in cases where there are not
serious concerns about the survivor's safety if the abuser were to be allowed any freedom.
Creative sentencing that combines no-contactorders with work-release punishes the abuser,
while incorporating a mechanism for requiring him to meet his financial obligations. In
addition to support, these obligations should cover lost wages, medical, counseling and
other treatment fees, and the replacement cost of property destroyed or damaged by the
abuser. Presentence diversion, conditioned upon complying with specific conditions, may
work in less serious cases. HART ET AL., supra note 15, at 34-35.
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CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS

The primary legal antidote to domestic violence which is used today
by all fifty states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands,
Guam, and Puerto Ric031 is the civil protection order. The protective
order serves as a convenient middle ground for dealing with the criminal
justice system's failure to prosecute crimes committed against intimates and
its traditional limitations in responding to the needs of the survivor. The
orders are injunctive, proscribing future assault or threat of assault. The
orders also allow for a variety of additional remedies, including custody
orders, support orders, and orders requiring the abuser to vacate the
residence. The survivor initiates the action, thereby controlling the
remedies available to assist her in disengaging from her batterer. The
process can also allow her an alternative to seeking a criminal conviction,
at least until the order is violated. This is attractive to those who are not
prepared to seek criminal prosecution for the reasons discussed in the
previous section.
Protective orders may be enforced through a variety of methods, such
as civil and criminal contempt proceedings, as well as criminal prosecution. 32 Where enforcement is sought through an action for criminal
contempt, the offender may, as with other criminal prosecutions, have the
right to counsel and other procedural protections33 unavailable to the
survivor. The result is that enforcement becomes as elusive as it is
intimidating.

III.

The Survivor as Prosecutor

Survivors of domestic violence are at a significant psychological,
social, economic, and procedural disadvantage in seeking to enforce

31. All 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have civil protection order
provisions. KLEIN & ORLOFF, supra note 7, at 810. See also P. FINN & S. COLSON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT
PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT (1990) [hereinafter DOJ STUDY]. The U.S. Virgin Islands
also have a statute providing for civil protection orders in cases of domestic violence. V.1.
CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 97 (1994).
32. A survey of the protection order statutes in the 50 states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico reveals that five statutes provide for civil contempt in the event of a
violation of a protection order; four statutes provide for criminal contempt; eight statutes
provide for both civil and criminal contempt; nine statutes classify violations as a
misdemeanor; and 13 statutes provide for civil contempt and classify violations as a
misdemeanor.
33. Some states applying criminal contempt procedures do not hold that the right to
counsel applies. See People ex reI. Williams v. Rhodes, 185 lll. App. 3d 114 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989).
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protective orders. Many battered women34 fear threats of reprisal, the
loss of their children, shame, and a lack of financial support. They often
blame themselves for the violence and try to minimize the extent of it.
They also try to rationalize the violence by focusing on the pressures or
problems facing their batterers, such as his job or lack of one, his status
in the community, and his relationships with the rest of his family.35
This is a particular problem for African-American women,36 who must
seek help from a system that has thrived on mistreating them and shackling
their men and boys. 37

34. Battered is a difficult image to use for purposes of identifying a group of people.
Battered conjures up gory visions of a person who does not exist beyond her state of
assault. See Schneider, supra note 4, at 530. The challenge is not defining a woman by
the abuse she has suffered, but fully crediting its impact upon her life.
35. The literature is replete with references to the barriers faced by survivors of domestic
violence seeking to stop the violence. See LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
(1979) (for the seminal discussion of domestic violence, including the phenomena of
learned helplessness and the cycle of violence); MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND
HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN (1992) (discussing the psychological impact of battering,
including post traumatic stress disorder); EVELYN C. WHITE, CHAIN CHAIN CHANGE
(1985) (discussing abuse as it relates to black women). See also WHAT'S LOVE GOT To
Do WITH IT? (Touchstone Pictures 1993) (the Tina Turner story).
36. The sociology of domestic violence differs among culturally diverse women of color,
depending upon their cultural context and the treatment of women within that context.
These differences underscore the challenge presented in considering the particularities that
need to be preserved, even as they are molded into workable generalities for purposes of
developing theories for responding to domestic violence. See Schneider, supra note 4. See
also Sharon Allard, Rethinking the Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist
Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 196-200 (1991) (discussing the different
stereotypes applied to black women and how that affects their treatment as survivors of
domestic violence). According to Allard, the concept of the battered woman as weak and
fearful is how white women in this society are viewed, not black women. Justifications for
the treatment of black women during slavery still cast black women as strong and suffering,
at best. Thus, black women are in less need of protection. Allard discusses this distinction
in the context of the battered woman syndrome, but she argues that feminist jurisprudence
must be redefined to reflect the impact of race, class, and gender.
37. See Beth Riche, Battered Black Women: A Challenge for the Black Community, 16
BLACK SCHOLAR 40 (1985) (discussing black women's perspectives on domestic violence,
including the difficulty of relying on a racist criminal justice system).
Being sensitive to the effects of racism and the victimization of black men does not
mean that African-American women must endure abuse by their partners. WHITE, supra
note 35, at 23. White quotes the following from PAT PARKER:

Brother
I don't want to hear
about
how my real enemy
is the system.
i'm no genius,
but i do know
that system
you hit me with
is called
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Thus burdened, women who have successfully obtained a protective
order must figure out how to persuade the court to enforce it when
violated. Most survivors and batterers enter the protective order stage pro
se. 38 States that specify a burden of proof generally require survivors to
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person accused
in the petition caused the harm alleged. 39 In most jurisdictions, courts
tend to be open to providing an injunction against future harm and to
creating other temporary remedies, such as custody and support,40 that
allow the survivor to function in the short term with a modicum of
independence from the abuser. 41 The remedial nature of the statutes

a jist.
Id. (quoting PAT PARKER, MOVEMENT IN BLACK (1983).
38. According to a study conducted by the National Institute of Justice, the majority of
petitioners seek protective orders without the assistance of counsel. The study reports tha~
in Nashville, during a three-month period in 1987, 80% of petitioners appeared pro se.
DOJ STUDY, supra note 31, at 24. During the last quarter of 1992,80.03% of petitioners
in Maryland appeared pro se, while only 2.67% were represented by counsel (the
remaining 17.3 % is unknown). MARYLAND NETWORK AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
REPORT ON FINDINGS FROM THE STATEWIDE STUDY ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PETITIONS
FILED FOR THE QUARTER OCTOBER 1 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1992 47 (1994)
[hereinafter MNADV STUDY]. In the District of Columbia, 65.8% of petitioners and
70.1 % of respondents appeared pro se, while 15.6% of petitioners were represented by
Corporation Counsel (in addition to those represented by private counselor law students).
Only 5.9% of respondents were represented by attorneys. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURTS, FINAL REpORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK
FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 143 (1992) [hereinafter D. C. GENDER BIAS TASK
FORCE REPORT].
39. Most protection order statutes are silent regarding the proper standard of proof in
protection order hearings. P. Finn, Civil Protection Orders: A Flawed Opportunity for
Intervention, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 155, 163 (Michael Steinman ed.,
1991) [hereinafter WOMAN BATTERING]; DOJ STUDY, supra note 31, at 33. Of the 13
statutes that mention standard of proof, the majority specify "preponderance of the
evidence." (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 947(e) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6301 (1994);
IOWA CODE § 236.4 (1995); KAN. REv. STAT. § 403.750(1) (1993); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 339.603 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-10-5 (1995); V.I. CODE ANN. § 97(a) (1993); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.50.060
(1994); WYo. STAT. § 35-21-105 (1995». Two other statutes specify standards other than
preponderance of the evidence. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(c)(2) (1994) (clear
and convincing evidence); WIS. STAT. § 813. 12(3)(a)(2) (1993) (reasonable grounds).
40. See, e.g., D.C. GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE REpORT, supra note 38, at 146-49
(outlining measures of relief granted in civil protection cases, including custody, support,
and visitation); DOJ STUDY, supra note 31, at 43 (discussing protective order provisions
for child custody and visitation).
41. This openness in imposing protective orders can be abused. In the District of
Columbia, jurisdiction for granting relief in the form of a protective order is, by statute,
available to the court upon fmding that an intra-family offense occurred. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-1005 (1981 & Supp. 1995). Judges often take the position that the protective order
should be entered to keep the peace. They often encourage respondents to consent to such
orders despite protestations of their innocence. This casual attitude toward the law in these
matters can have the negative impact of undercutting the court's interest in enforcement and
discrediting the protective order as evidence of a history of violence.
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encourages courts to issue protective orders. 42
Nonetheless, many
survivors approach the court with fear of both the abuser and the
institution, and they are often confused by the process. Many expect the
order obtained to provide a greater shield than it does,43 believing that the
court will automatically mete out punishment upon violation. They see
obtaining the protective order as the end of their advocacy, unaware that
the order is not self-enforcing and that they must initiate its enforcement. 44
42. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 547 A.2d 973,974 (D.C. 1988) (discussing the 1982
amendments to the District of Columbia'S Intrafamily Offenses Act as remedial of "several
critical weaknesses" in the Act, such as the growing, unmet demand for Civil Protection
Orders (CPOs), and the inadequate response of local police in assisting in the enforcement
of CPOs); Cloutterbuck v. Cloutterbuck, 556 A.2d 1082, 1084 (D.C. 1989) (noting the
1982 amendment to the District of Columbia's Intrafamily Offenses Act allowing petitioners
of CPO's to proceed pro se); Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929-31 (D.C. 1991)
(emphasizing that the remedial nature of the Intrafamily Offenses Act demands liberal
construction in furtherance of its remedial purpose; and the 1982 amendments broadened
the scope of available remedies because of the need to ensure that truly effective remedies
are ordered); Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C. 1993) (The Intrafamily
Offenses Act is a "remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit
of the class it is intended to protect. "); Green v. Green, 642 A.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. 1994)
(discussing the 1982 amendments to the District of Columbia's Intrafamily Offenses Act
that target the need to meet the growing demand for CPOs, in part, by authorizing
survivors of domestic violence to seek CPOs on their own initiative); Commonwealth v.
Allen, 486 A.2d 363,367 (pa. 1984) (describing Pennsylvania's Protection from Abuse Act
as the only method to remedy the serious and widespread societal problems of domestic
violence and spousal and child abuse, which would otherwise be effectively beyond reach);
Yankoskiev v. Lenker, 526 A.2d 429, 432-33 (pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (characterizing
Pennsylvania's Protection from Abuse Act as a "vanguard measure dealing with the
problems of wife and child abuse" and stating that the Act was designed to compensate for
the deficiencies of the criminal justice system in handling domestic abuse matters); State
v. J.F., 621 A.2d 520, 522 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (describing New Jersey's
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act as remedial legislation necessary to immediately and
effectively address the occurrence of domestic violence); Bates v. Bates, 795 S. W.2d 359,
360 (Ark. 1990) (stressing that Arkansas' Domestic Abuse Act is remedial legislation that
targets the prevention of domestic abuse, not after-the-fact punishment, by prescribing
simplified processes enabling survivors to promptly seek protective relief); Calloway v.
Kinkelaar, 633 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (describing one of the purposes of
the Illinois' Domestic Violence Act as expanding civil remedies for survivors of domestic
violence, such as allowing pro se petitions for orders prohibiting such abuse).
43. A study conducted by The Urban Institute in 1993 surveyed the issuance,
enforcement, and effectiveness of restraining orders in Colorado. Over half the women
who participated in the study reported violations of the restraining orders they had
obtained, including physical beating, forced sex, death threats, and harm to the children.
ADELE HARRELL ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, COURT PROCESSING AND THE EFFECTS
OF REsTRAINING ORDERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 49, 61 (1993).
Lawrence Sherman goes so far as to conclude that "[t]here is still no evidence that
these orders have any effect in reducing the risk or seriousness of future violence against
the victims. There is even one non-experimental study suggesting that protection orders
may increase the risk of further violence due to their weak enforcement." LAWRENCE W.
SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 238 (1992).
44. See HARRELL, supra note 43, at 67-68, 78.
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Tyree Castro's case is illustrative of this point. 45 Tyree is a twentyfour-year-old woman who lives in a subsidized apartment with her fouryear-old daughter, Tia Castro. She is fearful of Lloyd Davis, the father
of her daughter,46 with whom she lived for several months a few years
ago. 47 Tyree came to our clinic48 seeking assistance in enforcing the
protective order she obtained on her own. The order required Lloyd to
refrain from molesting, assaulting, threatening, or otherwise harassing
Tyree. The order also required Lloyd to stay away from her home and
person. 49 It granted Lloyd unsupervised visitation with his daughter, with
pick up and delivery provided by his mother so as to avoid the proscribed
contact. 50 The order was entered based on Tyree's testimony that Lloyd

45. This story is based on one of my cases, but the names of people and several facts
have been changed to protect the client's identity.
46. The District of Columbia defines an "intrafamily" offense as one that is committed
against a person "to whom the offender is related by blood, legal custody, marriage, having
a child in common, or with whom the offender shares or has shared a mutual residence [or]
with whom the offender maintains or maintained an intimate relationship not necessarily
including a sexual relationship." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (1995).
47. Although three-fourths of domestic violence cases occur where the woman and her
abuser do not live together because of divorce, separation, or never having cohabitated,
most states define a survivor eligible to file for protection orders as a spouse, family
member, cohabitant, or one who shares a child with the alleged abuser. DOJ STUDY,
supra note 31, at 10. Recent changes in some states' legislation expand the defmition of
the protected class in civil protection order statutes to include: parties in a "dating or
engagement relationship" (CAL. CIV. FROC. CODE § 1219(A) (West 1994); D.C. CODE
ANN., § 16-1001(5)(B) (1981 and Supp. 1995); "past or present unmarried couples"
(COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-800.3 (1994)); "former spouses" (MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 4-501 (1993»); "any other category of individuals deemed to be a victim of domestic
violence as defined by the department in regulation" (N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAW § 459(a)
(Consol. 1995)); "intimate partners ... currently or formerly involved in a romantic
relationship, whether or not such relationship was ever sexually consummated" (N .H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 173B:l (IV) (1994)); parties with a "sufficient relationship" (N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-01 (1995)); and parties who "have been involved in a sexually intimate
relationship with each other within two years immediately preceding the filing" (OR. REv.
STAT. § 107.705(2)(e) (1994)).
48. I refer here to the Families and the Law Clinic at Columbus School of Law, The
Catholic University of America.
49. This language appears on the District of Columbia's Civil Protection Orders which
are form orders required by the court. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c) (1995).
50. The judge's tendency in these cases has been to require unsupervised visitation,
despite the impact of violence upon the children and the opportunity to continue
intimidation and manipulation through the children. However, the Model Code does
provide that a court may "[s]pecify arrangements for visitation of any minor child by the
respondent and require supervision of that visitation by a third party or deny visitation if
necessary to protect the safety of the petitioner or child." THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES' MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY
VIOLENCE § 306(3)(b) (1994). Jurisdictions such as Maryland allow for supervised
visitation "[iJf the court fmds that the safety of a person eligible for relief will be
jeopardized by unsupervised or unrestricted visitation." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4506(d)(7) (1995). Additionally, some jurisdictions, North Dakota for example, consider
evidence of domestic violence as creating a presumption against an award of custody or the
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had followed her and slapped her around on several occasions and on her
testimony that on one occasion a few days before she had filed her petition
for a civil protection order (CPO), Lloyd had punched and kicked her
several times in her stomach, head, back, and arms. Even after Tyree had
obtained the protective order against him, Lloyd continued to engage in
violent and threatening behavior. Our initial interview with Tyree revealed
that Lloyd had threatened to kill her over the phone five days earlier. The
night before this call, she had seen him lurking outside of her apartment,
and a witness had seen Lloyd throw a rock through her bedroom window.
She was certain that he intended to carry out his threat to kill her. Her
visit to our office was only the second time she and her daughter had dared
to venture out of her apartment since Lloyd's telephone call. The first
time was their trip to court to tell the judge. Tyree had entered the
courtroom expecting to tell the judge what Lloyd had done in violation of
the order and that the judge would be duly incensed and impose the
punishment set down by law. Instead, she learned that Lloyd was entitled
to notice, that a hearing would be set, that an attorney would be appointed
to defend him, and that the government would even pay for his attorney
if he could not afford the cost. Having learned this from the courtroom
clerk, Tyree had filed her motion for contempt of the CPO and had gone
home. She came to our office a few days later frustrated and afraid.
We then had to add to the discouraging information that she had
already received. Lloyd's attorney would not be appointed until the day
we went to court. His counsel would come in and immediately request
time to prepare the case, and a new date would therefore be set, two to
three weeks hence. If Tyree had been proceeding with the contempt on
her own, the criminal defense attorney might have approached Tyree to
talk. The attorney would probably use high-pressure tactics to attempt to
dissuade her from pursuing the action. Tyree would have been up against
not only her abuser, but also his attorney, who is comfortable and familiar
with the courthouse environment.
A survivor in Tyree's position has not yet encountered a shift in the
burden of proof: the leap from the preponderance of evidence standard

granting of visitation to a battering spouse. BARBARA J. HART, ESQ., STATE CODES ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 31 (1992). Approximately 40 states require courts to consider
domestic violence when making custody awards. Nancy S. Erickson & Joan Zorza, Women
and Family Law in 1994, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 1117, 1119 (1995). The District
of Columbia requires that the court make written fmdings supporting a grant of custody to
an abusive party and limits an award of visitation to cases where the judge fmds that the
child and custodial parent can be adequately protected from harm by the abusive party.
The abusive party carries the burden of proving that visitation will not endanger the child
or significantly harm the child emotionally. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-911, 914 (1994). In
the District of Columbia, implementation of these provisions has been slow, with judges
reluctant to change long-held precepts about the importance of maintaining parental contact.
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applied to obtaining a protective order to the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard required for a criminal contempt conviction. 51 Also problematic
for a survivor is that the extent to which these quasi-criminal contempt
proceedings are criminal in other respects is not absolutely clear. Do
criminal rules apply with regard to discovery and evidence? Criminal
lawyers appointed to these cases are intent on applying the criminal rules,
which are the most familiar and favorable, but may not necessarily
apply. 52 This situation is not one specifically contemplated by the
criminal rules. The power balance is decidedly in favor of the respondent/defendant due to the nature of his relationship with the survivor. It
is tipped further in his favor because constitutional protections give him the
right to counsel and other benefits. This imbalance often leads to
withdrawal or dismissal of the contempt petition by the survivor,53 a
result that diminishes the remedial nature of the statute and seriously
undermines the physical safety of the petitioner.
Tyree was fortunate to have counsel representing her. The courtappointed counsel for the defendant, however, was extremely aggressive.
Viewing the student attorney 54 and myself as the prosecution, as opposed
to counsel for the petitioner, he blew past us, tapped our client on the
shoulder and said to her, "Come with me; I want to talk with you." After

51. I have observed this standard being met solely on the basis of the petitioner's
testimony in protective order contempt hearings in the District of Columbia. See also Klein
& Orloff, supra note 7, at 1109 (citing People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (upholding a conviction based solely on the petitioner's testimony)).
52. Criminal rules of procedure have been held inapplicable in the context of an
intrafamily contempt proceeding for the violation of a civil protection order by the D.C.
Court of Appeals. Green v. Green, 642 A.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. 1994). The Jencks Act
provides that the defense in a criminal prosecution may obtain for impeachment purposes
statements which have been made to government agents by government witnesses when the
"witness has testified on direct exam in the trial of the case." Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500(a) (1969). The court concluded that the criminal defendant's entitlement to Jencks
material is wholly inapplicable to the intrafamily contempt respondent. The court stated
that the Intrafamily Rules, not the criminal rules, govern. [d. at 1281-82.
53. The D.C. Gender Bias Task Force expressed concern over the inherent imbalance
in CPO contempt hearings, citing the frequency of prosecution by unrepresented parties,
as opposed to representation by private counselor Corporation Counsel attorneys, as a
substantial contributing factor in the "low rate of contempts found at trial." See D.C.
GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 38, at 153-54, 156. This source of
concern is similarly reflected in a study performed by the Maryland Network Against
Domestic Violence in 1994. The survey indicates that up to 25 percent of civil protection
orders are dismissed because of the petitioner's failure to appear at the initial hearing,
another policy that fosters an imbalance against the petitioner. See MNADV STUDY, supra
note 38, at 74-5. See also MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS 12-i3 (1989) (discussing barriers facing survivors of domestic violence who
attempt to petition for civil protection orders, including failure of judges to give the
survivor's testimony appropriate weight).
54. Students in clinics practice as attorneys under state student practice laws, provided
they are under the supervision of an attorney/instructor.
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a moment of shock, I stated that my client did not wish to speak with him.
He then proceeded to make a scene, marching into the courtroom, asking
that the case be called, telling the judge that we were obstructing justice,
and asking for an instruction that the complaining witness speak with him.
I argued that he had no right to talk directly to my client, and that even
under the criminal rules (which should not apply for reasons discussed
earlier), he had no right to talk to a complaining witness who did not wish
to speak with him. The judge did not address the procedural issue
regarding access to a criminal complainant/prosecutor who is represented
by counsel, stating simply that Tyree did not have to speak with defense
counsel if she did not want to. 55
Tyree, nonetheless, was quickly losing her will to proceed. She said
that she would not take the stand if that meant she had to answer the
opposing counsel's questions. No amount of coaxing could dissuade her.
We could have tried to proceed with the one witness who had seen Lloyd
throw the rock, but that would have greatly weakened the case. Also, we
could not be sure that defense counsel would not call upon her to testify.
Cases that are expected to go to trial are called last on the domestic
violence calendar in the District of Columbia. Non-contested protective
orders, dismissals, no shows, and minor motions are handled first. This
means that while all litigants are expected to show up at 8:30 a.m., trials
do not begin until late morning or early afternoon. By 11 :40 a.m., Tyree
was ready to leave court. Despite our efforts to shield her from the
courtroom tension, she was exhausted. We said that we would ask for a
continuance, but she insisted that we drop the case. She finally agreed to
more negotiation on our part with opposing counsel. After intense
negotiations, the contempt charge was held in abeyance with a return date
set for six months later. At least this gave Lloyd some reason to pause if
he planned to bother Tyree in the next several months.
Without counsel, Tyree may have fled the courthouse shortly after her
first confrontation with Lloyd's attorney. I have seen other women of
firmer resolve who were proceeding pro se intimidated or worn down by

55. Neither case law nor criminal rules of procedure expressly address whether or not
defense counsel can approach a complaining witness. A leading case dealing with witness
contact stresses that witnesses in a criminal proceeding cannot be claimed by either the
prosecution or the defense. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. 1966).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from communicating with
a party the lawyer knows to be represented. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 4.2 (1995). Currently the ABA's Standing Committee is circulating for public
comment a proposal that would substitute the word "person" for "party." In its proposed
amendment, the Standing Committee clarified that Rule 4.2 "protects represented persons
whether or not they are, in a formal sense, actual or prospective 'parties' to a proceeding
or transaction." STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 261-62 (1995).

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

356

[Vol. 6:2

defense counsel. The significant body of law designed to protect the
individual right to a presumption of innocence56 weighs against a survivor
proceeding alone in a foreign and, at this juncture, procedurally hostile
environment. As a result, the force of a civil protection order is
undermined.

IV.
A.

Protective Order Enforcement Options

MISDEMEANOR

In those jurisdictions in which violation of a protective order is itself
a crime, the government prosecutor is responsible for seeking enforcement.
Thirty states and the District of Columbia have made the violation of
protective orders a misdemeanor. 57 The 1994 Violence Against Women
Act makes interstate violation of a protective order a federal crime. 58
This trend toward criminalization is a statement about the seriousness of
the orders and the situations they reflect. It formally places enforcement
in the criminal context for procedural purposes and relieves the survivor
of the onus of conducting the prosecution. In practice, however, this
enforcement authority has not been pursued, and the survivor is still
expected to take responsibility for enforcement. 59 As Tyree's case
suggests, criminal prosecution does not protect her from defense counsel,
nor does it assure her a determinative voice in enforcement. Since the
charge that the perpetrator faces is directly related to the survivor's effort
to get protection, retaliation becomes more likely.
Neither the prosecutors nor the courts are accustomed to considering
the victims of crimes in more than an abstract way, at least until the
sentencing phase of a case where the victim impact statement may have

56. Our society's strong belief that all defendants are innocent until proven guilty, like
the corollary principle that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, is "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 763 (1987)
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937». The presumption of innocence
provides a guarantee of protection, through the Due Process Clause, to all persons accused
ofa crime. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441
U.S. 786, 790 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. DOJ STUDY, supra note 31, at 50-51; Domestic Violence in Romantic Relations Act
of 1994, § 2(b), D.C. Act 10-380 (March 1995). This Act imposes a fine of up $1000
and/or imprisonment for up to a period totalling 180 days.
58. Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1)(A)(i) (West 1994).
59. Although there appears to be no comprehensive data available as to actual numbers
of prosecutions, in states that offer a choice, advocates for survivors of domestic violence
report that most violations are still handled by the petitioner herself, not a prosecutor.
State coalitions against domestic violence in Alabama, Arkansas, llIinois, Maryland,
Minnesota, and Virginia, six states that offer the choice, report that the level of prosecution
occurring can vary widely from county to county within a state and that in most counties
criminal prosecution for violation of protection orders is not the norm.

Summer 1995]

PROTECTIVE ORDER ENFORCEMENT

357

some bearing upon the length of the incarceration. Misdemeanor
prosecution of protective order violations challenges the criminal justice
system to consider the safety of the survivor and the domestic responsibilities of the defendant in fashioning the appropriate punishments. It is a
challenge that courts are increasingly called upon to meet. 60
Enforcement of the protective order should be cumulative to prosecution of the underlying crime. This underscores the weight the order must
be given while demonstrating that domestic violence crimes are not a
separate category of lesser offenses. In pursuing both manners of
enforcement, complaints must be fashioned so as to avoid double jeopardy
challenges. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Dixon that such
challenges can be avoided so long as the contempt and criminal offenses
each contain an element that is not contained in the other. 61 Care should
be taken to assure that actions by the batterer that lead to prosecution for
violation of the protective order and prosecution for violation of criminal
statutes avoid the double jeopardy issue. A survivor proceeding pro se to
enforce the protective order is usually unaware of the double jeopardy
issue or unable to communicate with the prosecutor on this matter. If state
prosecutioll of protective order contempt citations is not pursued or if
counsel is not provided to the survivor, the result may be that the batterer
is insulated from penalties under the criminal statutes, which are often
more severe.
One type of protective order violation for which courts are reluctant
to impose criminal sanctions is the failure to make a required child support
payment. Protections accorded to debtors should not apply to batterers
who fail to pay support. 62 Money can, and is used to, continue the

60. In New York, for example, Family and Criminal Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to handle cases involving spousal abuse. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 530.11(1)
(McKinney 1984). See also Reed, supra note 28 (asserting that a single theory of
punishment for batterers is not sufficient to address the complexities presented by a
domestic violence case).
61. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). Dixon was the first time the
Supreme Court ruled in a domestic violence case. The Court found, using the "sameelements" or Blockburger test, that double jeopardy did not attach to a conviction for
contempt of the no assault provision of a civil protection order (CPO) followed by
indictment for assault with intent to kill and threats to injure or kidnap for the same events.
Double jeopardy did attach with regard to the simple assault indictment since proving the
contempt of the CPO required proof of the same elements with regard to the criminal
activity. In so ruling, the Court specifically overruled the "same-conduct" rule established
in Grady. [d. at 2859.
62. Most courts dealing with the issue of a criminal prosecution for the failure to pay
support under a civil protection order focus their concerns on the possibility of incarceration resulting from such a prosecution. Although such punishment seems to run afoul of
the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for a debt, courts have explained that
the imprisonment is not actually a result of the failure to pay a debt, but rather is imposed
solely for willful disobedience of a court's mandate. See Cramer v. Petrie, 637 N.E.2d
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manipulation and intimidation of the survivor. 63 In order to send a strong
message that the state intends to protect the survivor, it must be clear that
support ordered in domestic violence cases is not subject to the general
concerns about protecting debtors.
Criminal sanctions, including
incarceration, should apply in failure to pay support cases. Once
nonpayment is shown, the batterer must demonstrate that there are
unavoidable circumstances which make it impossible for the batterer to pay
support. Demonstrating the existence of unavoidable circumstances causes
the criminal case to collapse because of the lack of requisite intent.
For criminal sanctions to work, the prosecutor and judge, as well as
the correction, probation, and parole facets of the system, must commit
themselves to enforcement. It does no good for the prosecutor to
aggressively pursue enforcement if the judge will acquit or provide
exceptionally lenient sentences. Similarly, it does no good for the judge
to sentence an offender to probation if the probation officer is not vigilant
or to prison only to see the batterer paroled early. Domestic violence
survivors must be considered at each of these stages. If the batterer is to
be released, the survivor must be warned in advance. 64 If sentencing
involves batterer's counseling, the counselors must be trained in the area
of domestic violence,65 the batterer's attendance must be monitored, and

882, 886 (Ohio 1994); Diggs v. Diggs, 663 P.2d 950 (Alaska 1983); People v. Stanley,
376 N.E.2d 1095 (TIL App. Ct. 1978); Hoyt v. Pierce, 31 A.D.2d 582 (N.Y. App. Div.
1968). To ensure that the constitutional prohibition against incarceration for failure to
satisfy a debt is not violated, courts have undertaken two inquiries: (1) is the failure to pay
support under a civil protection order truly a debt, and (2) is the defendant's failure to pay
support a result of willful disobedience or indigence? Courts have consistently indicated
that support in arrears is not a debt in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather an
obligation that arises "by operation of law and is a personal duty owed to the former
spouse, the child, and society in general. It does not arise out of any business transaction
or contractual agreement, as does an ordinary debt." Cramer, 637 N .E.2d at 886. See
also Stanley, 376 N.E.2d at 1096. The mere fact of nonpayment alone does not establish
the failure as willful, justifying imprisonment. Rather, the court must hear evidence as to
the willfulness of the violation based on the financial ability of the respondent, past
violations, the needs of the petitioner, and all the facts and circumstances bearing on the
alleged willful failure. Poverty and misfortune may be valid excuses for nonpayment. See
Stanley, 376 N.E.2d at 1097; Hoyt, 31 A.2d at 582.
63. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 35, at 28, 172 (discussing the fmancial power held
by batterers, specifically by surveying fmancial manipulation of women regarding access
to checking and charge accounts); DUTTON, supra note 35, at 80-81 (identifying the lack
of battered women's resources to live independently as a major deterrent to women seeking
escape).
64. Minnesota law clearly states that before an individual arrested on a domestic violence
charge is released, a "reasonable and good faith effort" must be made to orally notify the
victim. MINN. STAT. § 629.72(6)(a) (1995). Such statutes indicate an increased
understanding by officials of the risks a survivor faces when seeking intervention by
authorities to help stop the abuse.
65. Counseling programs must challenge batterers to take responsibility for their
violence. Batterers may deny the behavior or try to minimize the effects. Poor counseling,
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consequences must follow a failure to attend. In this way, criminal
sanctions can be imposed in a manner that conveys intolerance of domestic
abuse while addressing the survivor's concerns. This calls for an
integration of criminal punishment and rehabilitative goals with domestic
relations concerns about family welfare. 66

B.

SHOW CAUSE ORDERS

Where there is reason to believe that a violation of an order has
occurred, a court has the authority to require a person who may have
violated the order to demonstrate why he or she should not be found in
contempt. Courts do this by issuing show cause orders. If the abuser is
found to have violated the protective order, then the statutory sanctions
would apply. Procedurally, this puts the initial burden on the batterer and
sends a clear message that the court has an interest in enforcing its own
orders. It also has the benefit of removing from the survivor the onus of
initiating prosecution. Notification of a violation should come by way of
a police or probation report filed with the court or by way of an affidavit
filed by the survivor or other witness. Notification should go directly to
the judge who issued the order. 67 As a practical matter, to go forward
on a criminal contempt, the batterer may have the right to have defense
counsel appointed. As discussed in the following section, for this
procedure to be effective, counsel for the survivor should also be appointed
by the court.
Judges are often unwilling to issue show cause orders because the
initiation of such action adds to already crowded dockets. Thus, for such
an enforcement approach to be reliable, judges would have to be required
to issue these orders, either by statute68 or by court rule.

that does not confront attitudes that allow the batterer to blame his conduct on the survivor,
merely serves to reinforce the beliefs that contributed to the batterer abusing the woman
in the first place. Programs that do not have a staff familiar with the dynamics of an
abusive relationship and the power and control issues involved in these relationships, not
only fail as rehabilitative measures, but may also place the survivor in danger of further
abuse. See ELLEN PENCE & MICHAEL PAYMAR, EDUCATION GROUPS FOR MEN WHO
BATTER (1993) (discussing how to conduct effective batterer's programs).
66. HART ET AL., supra note 15, at 13-16.
67. This is particularly important in jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia,
where judges rotate through the domestic violence calendar on a monthly basis. It is highly
unlikely that the issuing judge will be the judge hearing the contempt action. The judge
hearing the contempt action may not necessarily be familiar with domestic violence issues,
law, and procedure. The judge who takes up the case anew has little of the history and
may not be as committed as the issuing judge to the integrity of the order. Thus, the
inclination to issue a show cause order will be all the less attractive.
68. It is not clear whether on the state level this would cross any separation of power
lines. Courts are instructed by legislators with regard to standards of proof, sentencing,
awards, and so on. The enforcement of civil protection orders, by requiring show cause
hearings, is analogous.
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COURT-ApPOINTED COUNSEL FOR THE SURVIVOR

In states where the survivor is responsible for pursuing criminal

contempt for the violation of a protective order, the accused has no right
to a public prosecutor. 69 There is neither authority supporting the right
to a public prosecutor, nor to court-appointed counsel, for one seeking to
enforce the order. The court may have the authority to appoint counsel for
the survivor,70 but it is not required to do so. As described above, this
can leave the survivor with the overwhelming task of having to battle both
her abuser and his counsel on her own.
Federal funding, comparable to that provided to guarantee defendant's
access to counsel under the Criminal Justice Act,71 would provide states
with the ability to appoint counsel to represent survivors in enforcing
protective orders. 72 Under this scheme, lawyers trained in domestic
violence law would be chosen from a list kept by the court for appointments. While protecting the rights of the accused in a criminal action is
essential, it is no less essential to protect the survivor, who asks the court
to enforce its order.
Since there is currently no federal funding of this type, and with local
law and budget constraints limiting the court's ability to pay fees to
counsel, pro bono counsel should, at a minimum, be appointed from a
court-maintained list of attorneys trained in the area of domestic violence
to represent the survivor who is seeking to enforce her protective order.
The court or the bar should provide training in this area for these
attorneys. 73 In any event, thrusting the burden of enforcement of civil

69. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that one accused of violating a
protective order does not have a constitutional right to a public prosecutor. Green v.
Green, 642 A.2d 1275, 1281 (D.C. 1994).
70. For example, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia authorizes the court to
"request" that the Corporation Counsel, a hybrid of some of the functions of a state
attorney and attorney general, represent the petitioner seeking to enforce the protective
order. D.C. SUP. CT. R. INTRA-FAM. 12(c)(2).
71. "Each United States District Court ... shall place in operation ... a plan for
furnishing representation for any person fmancially unable to obtain adequate representation
" Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1988). Funding for such
representation is "authorized to be appropriated to the United States courts, out of any
money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated . . . . Payments from such appropriations shall be made under the supervision of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts." Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(i) (1988).
72. While federal funding of any kind seems elusive in the current political climate, one
exception is in the area of criminal prosecution. Translating enforcement of civil protection
orders into criminal prosecution may gain some support even in this austere fiscal climate.
73. In the District of Columbia, once a year, the local bar provides training and
materials, free of charge, to lawyers who are willing to represent survivors of domestic
violence in at least two protective order cases. The cases can, but are not required to, be
enforcement cases. A list of lawyers willing to represent survivors of domestic violence
is maintained by a project associated with the Georgetown University Law Center's Sex
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protection orders upon the survivor, without assuring that she will be
represented, is both unrealistic and ineffective.

Conclusion
Family violence is a horrific crime because it both engulfs its victims
with fear and brings danger that seeps through the crevices of the
survivor's sanctuary, exploding where there is little chance for respite.
Without a firm commitment to combat family violence, this behavior will
continue to flow from generation to generation, surfacing in criminal
activity within and beyond the home. The very existence of protective
orders suggests a failure on the part of the criminal justice system to
effectively respond to domestic violence. These orders also highlight the
complexity of the issues raised and the difficulty of applying a narrow
state-versus-perpetrator-to-the-exclusion-of-victim approach to these
crimes. Domestic violence necessarily entails a hybrid of criminal and
family law and thus demands creativity. This does not mean counseling
instead of punishment, nor does it mean light sentences. The message that
violence in the home is serious, and will not be tolerated, must be clear.
That this message requires a complex response makes it no less compelling.
While protective orders exist because of the historical failure of
jurisdictions to prosecute domestic violence, the response to domestic
violence by the state should not be relegated entirely to the criminal justice
system. Many domestic violence incidents cannot meet criminal prosecution standards because of the high burden of proof required in criminal
cases. Intervention by the courts, through protective orders, provides
immediate relief by way of vacate, stay away, and support orders.
Furthermore, injunctive relief against violence, while redundant of criminal
statutes, is beneficial because it provides quick relief in a relatively userfriendly setting. It also provides an intermediate step for the survivor,
who is not prepared to seek criminal prosecution, yet wishes to send a
message that violence will not be tolerated. Once issued, these orders
must be enforced.
Enforcement of protective orders may be accomplished through a
variety of methods, including criminal prosecution, judicially initiated
show cause orders, and survivor initiated criminal contempt proceed-

Discrimination Clinic. There is no provision requiring the court to appoint counsel for the
petitioner from that list, nor is there any governmental support that would assure that such
a project continue.
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ings. 74 The availability of all of these methods to the survivor is essential
in combatting domestic violence.
Without diligent enforcement, the protective order becomes yet another
symbol of the cultural denigration of issues central to the health and
security of women. Courts will continue to issue orders, but without a
system that ensures enforcement there will be little commitment to their
integrity. The resulting devastation for families and, by extension, society,
is as much beside the point as it is the point.

74. Although creative approaches like civil contempt of protective orders may have some
impact, for the most part, criminal contempt carries a stronger message of condemnation.
Tort law may also provide some relief. See HART, supra note 50, at 41-43.

